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ANTI-TRUST AND ORGANIZED IABOR:
LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND
THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE
JAMES M. MURRAY*
Every lengthy strike which involves large numbers of workers
and creates public inconvenience brings demands for more govern-
ment control of the collective bargaining process. Some groups
demand compulsory arbitration while others would use the courts
to curb the ability of unions to strike. Included among the pro-
posals has been one to apply anti-trust laws to labor unions. This
suggestion was the basis for the national collegiate debate in 1961.
The question was not resolved by the debators and it is not likely
to be resolved by this article, but a consideration of some of the
experience with anti-trust laws and the objectives of applying them
to organized labor may provide insights into the appropriateness
of the proposed action.
To the student of labor history the question is more properly,
should labor unions again be subjected to anti-trust laws? The
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was applied both directly and
indirectly to organized labor until the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
made it clear that this was not the intent of Congress. The Sherman
Act caused Samuel Gompers and many other labor leaders to spend
as much time in the courts fighting cases, and in the halls of
Congress lobbying for relief from this act, as they spent organizing
workers. When the Clayton Act was passed in 1914, Gompers called
it labor's Magna Carta because he thought it had removed labor
and unions from the jurisdiction of anti-trust laws. Subsequent inter-
pretations by the courts proved him wrong, however, and only
in 1932 was relief successfully granted.'
The indirect applications of the Sherman Act came first, in
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the form of injunctions. Under the Act the Attorney General was
authorized to seek an injunction in the federal courts to prevent
attempts to monopolize or restrain trade. In the Pullman Strike
of 1894 the courts used this, together with the union's interference
with the transport of mails and with interstate commerce as the
basis for an injunction. 2 Because there were so many other grounds
for an injunction in that case, the use of the Sherman Act seemed
unnecessary However, the criminal case against Debs broke down
in the argument over conspiracy, and a remedy was sought in
equity, where Debs was convicted of contempt for refusing to obey
an injunction ordering him to stop the strike. The civil remedy in
equity was presumably intended to avoid the jury trials in criminal
cases in favor of decisions by presiding judges who were inclined
to be more cooperative than jurors in opposing union growth.8
Whatever the intent, the introduction of the Sherman Act in the
Pullman Strike paved the way for its use as the basis for many
subsequent injunctions.
According to the traditional view, the injunction was a device
designed to prevent unrecoverable damages such as the destruction
of a grove of trees while the title to the trees was in dispute. In
the case of the Sherman Act, it could prevent firms from destroying
competitors m an effort to corner a market. When applied to unions,
however, it usually meant that the courts were treating a loss of
profits during a strike as unrecoverable damages. Such a position
was not only a new legal interpreatation of the concept, but was
based upon highly questionable economic assumptions. While a
strike, if effective, stops the operation of a plant and therefore
interferes with the firm's chances of making a profit, profits are
not the certain result of operating a plant. Where damage to
tangible property such as buildings and machines is imminent, in-
junctions are in order, and in fact are still used, but profits are
an intangible and unrealized form of property when a strike is
initiated. The court made no distinction in this matter between
firms making profits when the strike started and those losing money
The broad interpretation of what constitutes irreparable damages
plagued the union movement for several decades. About 2,000
injunctions were issued in labor disputes between 1880 and 1931.4
These injunctions usually were based either on the Sherman Act or
the so-called "yellow-dog" contracts. Yellow-dog contracts were
agreements between employees and employers under which workers
2. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578, 579, 581, 582 (1895).
3. MANNING, THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF 1894, 52, 53 (1960).
4. Wn'T, Tna GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES, 84 (1932).
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agreed, as a condition of employment, not to join a union. Injunctions
were issued against union organizers to enjoin them from inducing
breach of contract. This also represented a new use of injunctions,
and a new form of tort liability which the courts allowed to curb
the unions.5
The direct application of the Sherman Act to unions was initiated
'in the famous Danburry Hatters Case of 1908.6 The unions used
a secondary boycott of Loewe's hats to effect an organization of
the company's workers. The company sued for triple damages under
the Sherman Act and not only won the case but the Supreme Court
made individual union members liable for damages not covered
by the union treasury Here again, a traditional legal concept was
significantly broadened when applied to the unions. The Sherman
Act makes illegal, "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations. "
Restraint of trade at common law referred to the limitation
of output by a monopolist interested in raising a price to make
excessive returns. Essentially, it meant a restraint of competition.
As applied to the unions, however, restraint was treated as a
synonym of interference. In this context, physically preventing
the shipping or production of goods was treated as restraint of
trade. Thus, any strike or boycott would automatically qualify
as a monopolistic act whether or not it affected prices or wages.8
The Danburry Hatters Case generated enough public sympathy
to cause the Democrats to make relief from anti-trust laws for
unions a part of their platform in 1912. In spite of Woodrow Wilson's
reluctance, Congress included provisions restricting the applicability
of anti-trust laws to labor unions in the Clayton Act of 1914. This
Act basically was designed to strengthen the Sherman Act as
applied to business enterprise by designating certain specific prac-
tices as illegal. However, Section 6 declared, "That the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce."9 This
provision was significant because most people assumed that anti-
trust laws were intended to prevent monopolizing of commerce in
goods, and if labor is not a commodity, these laws would not apply
to organizations dealing exclusively in labor services. In Section
20 of the Clayton Act it is stated that disputes arising out of employer-
employee relationships shall not be subject to the anti-trust laws or
5. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, 93-95 (1961).
6. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
7. JOHNSON, GoVERNMENT-BuSINESS RELATIONS, 306, 307 (1965).
8. GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 208.
9, MANNING, op. cit. supra note 3, at 56.
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to injunctions based upon these laws. 10 Labor leaders were thereby
convinced that they were free from the legal devices which the
courts had sanctioned to restrict their growth.
The First World War forced cooperation between unions, man-
agement, and government, but when the war ended management
resumed its fight to prevent, or at least limit, the organization of
labor In 1921, a decision by the Supreme Court in the Duplex case
upheld an injunction based upon the anti-trust acts and thus demon-
strated that the courts would not let the Clayton Act prevent them
from cooperating with management's efforts to curb union growth."'
The Court reasoned that the Clayton Act applied only to direct
employees of the firm involved in a dispute, but did not prevent
enjoining union organizers or non-employee pickets. In subsequent
cases, such as the Coronado case in 1912, and the Bedford Cut Stone
case in 1927, the court went further, declaring that strikers them-
selves may be considered to have severed their direct relationship
with the employer, and thus declared both direct and indirect tech-
niques of organizing workers (i.e., strikes and secondary boycotts)
to be subject to the anti-trust acts. 2
This experience caused the unions and their sympathizers to
press for new legislation which would be explicit in its exemption
of unions from anti-trust laws and injunctions. Prominent among
those advocating such reform legislation was Felix Frankfurter,
the late associate justice of the Supreme Court, who denounced the
abuse of the injunction m labor disputes m his book entitled, The
Labor Injunction (1930) Frankfurter's influence was apparent in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. Co-sponsored by Senator Norris
of Nebraska and the colorful ex-mayor of New York, Fiorello La-
Guardia, the bill made it very clear that Congress did not want
the anti-trust laws applied to labor individually or collectively It
severely restricted the use of all injunctions in labor disputes and
declared yellow-dog contracts unenforceable in the courts.'3
This Act, together with the Wagner Act of 1935, legally paved
the way for a growth in union membership from about 3 million in
1933 to over 8 million by 1940 and to 14 million by 1950.14
Perhaps it should be noted here that labor unions remain subject
to anti-trust laws if they collude with management to set prices.
In the Allen-Bradley case, decided in 1945, an injunction against
10. Ibid.
11. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
12. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) Bed-
ford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Association, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
13. MANNiNa, Op. ct. supra note 3, at 57, 58.
14. COHEN, LABOR IN THm UNITED STATES, 158 (1960).
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the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and their various
employers to prevent them from establishing a monopoly for local
firms on local business m the New York area, was upheld by the
Supreme Court. In this case, the union's agreement presumably
directly affected the price of the product sold as well as the price
of labor services. 15 This decision raises an interesting question:
if a direct relationship between wages and prices is demonstrated,
would unions again be subject to anti-trust laws? In the Allen-
Bradley case, the Court implied that unions are in violation of
anti-trust when their demands influence the price of the product.
Many economists contend that this is always the case. The relation-
ship between wages and prices has been analyzed in many lengthy
treatises by economists, notably William G. Bowen and John M.
Clark.16 The extent of the effect of wages upon prices is not com-
pletely clear, even to economists, but there is little doubt that
prices are influenced by wages. The only real argument is over
the initial direction of causality; do wages determine prices to a
greater degree than prices determine wages? The court did not
concern itself with this aspect of the question in the Allen Bradley
case, but was content to conclude that when collusion is present,
unions are affecting prices of goods, but when there is no collusion
between unions and management, unions are only influencing the
price of labor services. Apparently the court is much more concerned
with the means than with the ends of collective bargaining.
The Allen Bradley case also raises a question concerning what
constitutes collusion between management and labor If the prices
of the company's product become a matter for collective bargaining,
would the contract which includes agreements on the price to be
charged constitute collusion? In 1957 Walter Reuther made overtures
to the General Motors Corporation asking that they reduce the aver-
age price of their cars in exchange for lower wage demands by the
United Auto Workers. The company refused to relinquish its care-
fully guarded prerogative to set prices, but what if some company
eventually capitulates to this demand? In the U.A.W example, the
union was interested in lowering the price of the product, but there
are easily as many cases in which unions might want prices raised.
If prices become a part of the bargaining process, unions would
clearly be influencing the prices of products as well as the price of
labor services, and where industry-wide bargaining is practiced,
these agreements would be closely akin to collusively determined
15. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
16. BOWEN, THE WAGE-ISsUe: A THEORETICAL ANALSIs (1960), CLARK, THE WAGE
PRICE PROBLEM (1960).
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prices. The Allen Bradley decision establishes a rather clear prece-
dent for applying anti-trust laws to the parties to such contracts.
This review of the experience of unions with the anti-trust law
is intended to demonstrate that anti-trust laws were very effective
in limiting the growth and effectiveness of organized labor during
the early part of this century and to point out that they still apply
to unions under certain circumstances. The question remains, how-
ever, would the application of anti-trust laws to unions in the present
environment, even when they are not colluding with management,
improve the outcome of the collective bargaining process?
Unions today are in a very different situation than they were in
the early decades of this century Their main activity then was
organizing the unorganized while their main activity today is bar-
gaining new contracts for their members. Increases in union mem-
bership during the 1960's have been largely attributable to an in-
creased labor force rather than an active organizing effort on the
part of established unions. While some unions are actively organ-
izing to retain members where automation is displacing workers,
and a new militance is emerging among public employees and
migrant workers, many of the well established unions are spending
most of their time and money on contract negotiations, grievance
settlements, and political activity Much of the organizing effort
among some of the more aggressive of the large unions takes the
form of raiding existing unions rather than organizing the unorgan-
ized.
The significance of this change in union activity over time is
that the anti-trust laws were most effective in preventing the or-
ganizing of non-union plants, especially by curbing organizing strikes
and secondary boycotts. These practices are now outlawed by the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley) This Act
also limits many other union practices in a much more precise
manner than would the anti-trust laws. In fact, the entire body of
labor legislation, which includes the Railway Labor Act of 1926
(extended to airlines in 1936), the Wagner Act of 1935, the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, gives the
United States one of the most complete and restrictive legal frame-
works for collective bargaining of the major western industrial
countries. If the anti-trust laws were added to this body of regula-
tory laws there would be a great deal of overlapping and duplication,
as some practices (such as the secondary boycott) would clearly
be in violation of both labor and anti-trust laws. Would the addition
of anti-trust laws to the body of labor legislation improve the en-
vironment for collective bargaining? Would it make it possible to
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break up substantial power blocs within the labor movement? One
way to approach the answer to these questions is to examine the
effectiveness of the anti-trust laws in accomplishing their original
purpose.
There are many and various explanations for the passage of the
Sherman Act. It is commonly understood that the law was a re-
action to the power wielded by the industrial and financial giants of
the day who came to be called the "robber barons." The wording
of the law, however, does not suggest an interest in breaking up
existing holdings but rather in maintaining competition. At common
law, contracts which would seriously reduce competition were simply
unenforceable in the courts, but the Sherman Act went a step further
and made them illegal. Nevertheless, the law has seldom been
used to reduce the size of any firm or to attempt to increase the
number of firms in an industry The application of anti-trust laws
has not only failed to reduce the size of firms, industrial concentra-
tion has increased while these laws have been in force. In 1914,
55.3 per cent of manufacturing employees were in the largest 5 per
cent of manufacturing firms while the comparable figure for 1947
was 62.3 per cent. In 1909, 24.6 per cent of all industrial assets
were owned by the largest 100 industrial corporations, while in 1948
the figure was 26.7 per cent. Furthermore, with very few excep-
tions, the list of firms included in the largest 100 has not changed
in the past fifty years. Even in the case of the Standard Oil Com-
pany, one of the few to be subdivided by an anti-trust action, each
of the resulting divisions remained among the largest oil companies
in the country 17 The courts have assumed that the intent of the
law and the best interest of the nation would be served better by
attempting to preserve competitive practices among already large
firms rather than by attempting to break up the giant corporations
into small competitive units.
The commitment to competition in our society stems, in part,
from the suggestion by Adam Smith and others that competition
would regulate a market-directed economy in such a manner as to
produce the best possible product for the lowest possible price.
Competition, however, does not maintain itself but as Smith himself
pointed out, businessmen have a strong tendency to conspire to
monopolize trade.1 While conspiracies to monopolize or restrain
trade were contrary to common law, Congress and the public were
not satisfied with the Court's interpretation and enforcement of the
17. EGGERS AND TussIO, THE COMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 58, 59 (1965).
18. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOURCES AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
265 (1776).
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common law and, therefore, it was formalized in the Sherman Act.
Even as the act passed, a contradiction was apparent in the public's
goals. Competition requires many firms and circumstances which
permit new firms to enter a market if present firms are overcharg-
ing or using less than the best techniques. However, the best
techniques, which would result in the lowest cost per unit of output,
were available only to the very large firms. The public faced a
dilemma: to enjoy the self-regulatory effects of competition requires
a large number of firms in every industry, but with so many firms
sharing the market none of them can operate on a. scale large
enough to permit the low-cost, capital-intensive, assembly-line tech-
niques. To benefit from the economies of large scale production
techniques, the market must be given to a small number of firms.
Allowing few firms to dominate an industry invites collusion and
monopolistic pricing practices.
The dilemma has been resolved, to a degree, by striving for
what the noted economist John M. Clark labelled "workable com-
petition." That is, we permit a few large firms to dominate an
industry, allowing ourselves the benefits of economies of scale, and
simultaneously apply anti-trust laws to prevent these firms from
fully exercising their monopoly powers. Consequently, the main em-
phasis in anti-trust enforcement has been on business practices rath-
er than the size of the firms. Even here the success is questionable.
There is a fine line between collusive price setting, parallel action,
and price leadership. The first two have been declared illegal be-
cause they involve or imply overt collusion. The latter is practiced
blatantly in many of our major industries, but because it does not
require an actual meeting between the parties, it remains exempt
from the anti-trust laws despite the fact that it produces essentially
the same result. As mentioned earlier, the courts appear to be
more concerned with the means than with the ends of business
practices.
The success of our anti-trust statutes is hard to assess. It is
clear that large concentrations of few firms dominate most of our
industries, especially in manufacturing, and that the degree of con-
centration is probably increasing. It is also clear that monopolisitc
pricing practices are being tolerated. The best that one can honestly
say is that the United States has prevented the complete carteliza-
tion of major industries, which has occured in some other industrial
nations, and that the anti-trust laws have played a role in this
process. The enforcement of anti-trust laws has not been consistent,
often depending upon the vigor of the individual in the Justice De-
partment charged with prosecuting under the Acts. While the court
286
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claims consistency m the interpretation of the Acts, it is hard for
a non-attorney to agree with this claim after observing the rulings.
There is little reason to believe that the courts would be much
clearer on what practices by unions would be in violation of the
Acts than they have been in the case of business enterprise.
It is, then, difficult to anticipate which acts by unions would
be declared illegal as restraints of trade with intent to monopolize.
If the purpose of the anti-trust acts is to maintain competition and
prevent monopolies, then it must be decided to what extent unions
are monopolies. In strict economic terms, competition results in a
price set by the market, and any single entity which can affect the
price of the product it sells has some degree of monopoly power
In this context, one might ask, are unions monopolies? If unions
cannot at least affect the price of labor services, they would be
failing significantly in one of their self-defined goals, namely to raise
the wages of their members. According to the economic definition,
then, a union must have a degree of monopoly power to be even
minimally effective.
It is doubtful, however, that the economic definition of competi-
tion would be the basis for establishing violations under the anti-
trust acts because the legal definition has never conformed to the
economic definition. For example, m the Standard Oil case of 1911,
the Court developed the "rule of reason" which suggested that only
undue or unreasonable acts evidencing a clear intent to monopolize
are in violation of the Sherman Act.19 There is no economic law
which provides a basis for the fine distinction between reasonable
and unreasonable acts by monopolists. Inasmuch as the words
"Every contract," and "Every person" are used in the Sherman
Act to indicate the extent of coverage, one can only presume that
this is another example of the willingness of the court to interpret
the intent of the Congress and to enforce the spirit rather than the
letter of the law Which acts by unions would be unreasonable?
Perhaps those which threaten the nation's health, safety, or welfare.
Legal remedies are already available to deal with such situations.
Would the anti-trust laws allow injunctions where Taft-Hartley does
not? Historical evidence suggests that it would depend largely on
the attitude of the presiding magistrate towards unions. From the
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 until the 1930's, those on the
bench were generally unsympathetic with the union movement. With
the exception of the most notable dissenters such as Holmes and
Brandeis, most justices supported the propertied classes and often
interpreted the law accordingly There is little evidence of such
19. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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conservatism on the high court bench today, and few would expect
the Warren Court to be very interested m breaking the unions.
Another application of the "rule of reason" declared that size
alone was not evidence of a monopoly 20 In later cases, such as
the Alcoa case decided in 1945, that position was modified so that
size does not constitute a monopoly unless the firm produces some
very high percentage of the industry's total output.2 1 How would
this aspect of the "rule of reason" apply to unions? If the per-
centage of workers m an industry were the criterion (and if the
court could agree on the definition of an "industry"), almost all
of the craft unions would probably be in violation of the Acts, be-
cause they represent 80 to 90 per cent of the craftsmen in each
trade, while the largest national union in the country, the Teamsters,
could remain unscathed because of its diverse membership.
Allowing companies to be large (if not too large) will, of nec-
essity, result in large unions since the company is the logical unit
for bargaining. Allowing industry-wide pricing practices encourages
industry-wide bargaining by industry-wide unions. Unless the courts
are inclined to assume that the anti-trust laws were intended to
break large corporations into smaller units, it is difficult to conclude
that they would interpret them this way if applied to unions.
If legislation were passed to apply anti-trust laws to labor
unions, there is little evidence that these laws could be used to
break up the existing large unions. History suggests that they would
be most effective in preventing new groups from being organized.
A new union among migrant workers could probably be hurt badly
by the anti-trust laws as once interpreted. Large, well-established,
and wealthy unions would find the laws much less troublesome.
This could force the unorganized workers to rely exclusively on exist-
ing unions to organize them and might tend to perpetuate and in-
crease the power of existing unions rather than decrease it.
20. United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
21. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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